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Assessing the intangibles transferred in franchise businesses 1	  
 2	  
1 Introduction 3	  
The business model that has grown the most and has been the most successful worldwide 4	  
in recent decades is franchising due to its considerable increase in the commercial 5	  
distribution area, and to the constant increase in franchisors and franchisees in both 6	  
developed and developing countries (Rondán et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the decision to 7	  
adopt the franchise system requires the careful analysis of various aspects such as staff 8	  
selection, location, etc. (Forward and Fulop, 1993). 9	  
Research into franchise relationships generates two groups: those that 10	  
qualitatively focus on dyadic relationships from the agents’ organizational viewpoint and 11	  
those that attempt to quantify the exchanges taking place in the relationship by means of 12	  
a franchising contract with empirical studies. As part of these exchanges, the franchisor 13	  
enables the brand name and a series of intangible assets to be exploited in exchange for 14	  
an upfront fee and periodic payments paid by the franchisee. In light of this, Álvarez 15	  
(2007) defined the franchising chain as intensive businesses in intangible assets that do 16	  
not deteriorate with use and which are hard to commercialize.  This research presented 17	  
here is within the context of empirical research studies into franchising relationships. 18	  
Pioneering studies on franchising focused on analyzing the indicators of the 19	  
franchise value, such as those of Baucus et al. (1993) carried out on franchises in the US. 20	  
These authors determined the influence of the firm’s age, its presence in the market and 21	  
growth in the number of franchises in terms of upfront fees and royalties. These drivers 22	  
2 
 
have been considered by several studies analyzing the firms´ propensity to franchise. 1	  
(Gillis and Castrogiovanni, 2010). Later research looked deeper into the many aspects 2	  
that intervene in the relationship, which is based on cooperation rules, information 3	  
exchanges and the continuity of the relationship (Bordonaba and Polo, 2003) and evolves 4	  
throughout its life cycle (Blut et al, 2010). Whatever the degree of the relationship’s 5	  
orientation, the franchisee’s trust in the franchisor is essential for a satisfactory 6	  
relationship to emerge (Bordonaba and Polo, 2008), as is partner commitment (Fernández 7	  
and Martín, 2006). Moreover, franchise business formats must develop to consider the 8	  
capabilities and intentions among participating stakeholders (De Castro et al., 2009). The 9	  
organisational drivers should be considered as a main issue in the franchise selection 10	  
decision process (Altinay and Okumus, 2010). Indeed, the greater the complexity of the 11	  
knowledge transmitted, which is measured by the number of services the franchisor 12	  
provides to the franchisee, not only when the activity commences, but also as long as the 13	  
relationship lasts, the more it helps to develop business and to make the system more 14	  
efficient (Minguela-Rata et al., 2009). 15	  
However, conflicts can emerge in this relationship, known as the channel conflict 16	  
derived from the franchisors’ need to control their franchisees, and from their authority as 17	  
legally independent businesspeople. Another emerging conflict is the territorial 18	  
encroachment-related conflict, which takes place when new franchisees appear to 19	  
compete with and encroach on already existing ones. The latter may even offer positive 20	  
value to not only the franchisor when an exclusivity clause is included in the contract, but 21	  
also to the franchisee by purchasing this exclusivity (Nair et al., 2009). Likewise, this 22	  
competence among franchises means their numbers increase, which lowers their incomes, 23	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and this gives rise to a negative relationship between the royalties and the number of 1	  
franchises (Chu and Liu, 2003). 2	  
Whereas the upfront fee tends to be a set amount, royalties are normally 3	  
calculated as a percentage of the franchisee’s sales or profits as profit sharing between the 4	  
franchisor and the franchisee (Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994). Whereas sales-based 5	  
royalties are a widely used system in the USA, systems based on profit margins are more 6	  
frequently used in countries like Japan, and may lead to lower prices, more sold amounts 7	  
and more profit in the channel (Jeon and Park, 2002). In some countries, however, 8	  
royalties are set as flat rate continuing franchise fees (Frazer, 1998), as in the case of 9	  
Australia, which means that the franchisor makes less effort in helping his or her flat fee 10	  
franchisors invest less effort in monitoring their franchisees. 11	  
Other aspects which affect the value of royalties and upfront fees are each 12	  
country’s legislation (Brickely, 2002), the sectors and the degree of franchising maturity. 13	  
Therefore, Bordonaba et al. (2008) observed higher franchise fees and royalties in the 14	  
restaurant business sector than in the fashion sector, and also a greater expansion of the 15	  
newer franchises going through a stage of more rapid growth. 16	  
Harmon and Griffiths (2008) considered that the relational equity and social 17	  
exchange theories were relevant to support the relational value perceived in franchising. 18	  
That is, relationships must be based on the mutual franchisor-franchisee benefit and on 19	  
the balance between the inputs and outputs that this exchange generates. Thus, the 20	  
upfront fee represents not only the relational value perceived by the franchisor through 21	  
tangible and intangible benefits, but also the expenses incurred while the relationship 22	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between the franchisor and franchisee lasts. In other words, the franchisee accepts paying 1	  
the upfront fee in exchange for receiving the franchisor’s know-how, which is an 2	  
intangible asset that allows the franchisee to set up a business guaranteed to succeed. 3	  
Therefore, the upfront fee paid is considered to be the value of franchise business 4	  
intangibles, and this value is associated with the firm’s capabilities, the brand name 5	  
image and the firm’s goodwill, all of which are intangible resources (Caves and Murphy, 6	  
1976). 7	  
In the empirical studies conducted to date that attempt to account for the payment 8	  
of royalties and upfront fees, many operative variables have been used in relation to: size, 9	  
firm age, presence in markets, etc., and other economic and financial-type variables have 10	  
not been included. Additionally, considering a high number of variables makes it difficult 11	  
to understand the meaning of the intangibles transferred in the relationship. Moreover, 12	  
these studies have been conducted with franchising data from the USA, Canada and 13	  
Europe. Consequently, the main objective of this study is to obtain an econometric model 14	  
that explains the joint influence franchisors’ operative, economic and financial variables 15	  
on the payments made to franchisees in the Mexican restaurant industry, and to identify 16	  
the intangible elements that underlie these variables and are transmitted in these 17	  
franchising relationships. We present an empirical analysis to define the fundamental 18	  
reasons and concepts for which franchisees are willing to pay the franchisor initial and 19	  
periodic fees as part of this transfer-based relationship. We also analyze whether these 20	  
fees complement or substitute each other. 21	  
The main novelty of this study is that it is the first to jointly analyze operative and 22	  
financial variables of chains to determine the underlying factors in these variables and to 23	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explain the value of the intangibles transferred in the relationship rather than identifying 1	  
strategic groups (Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991; Rondán et al., 2007).  2	  
To meet these objectives, we propose the following structure for this study. We 3	  
now go on to analyze the importance of the restaurant industry in Mexico and other 4	  
countries, the contributions made by studies into franchises, and the characteristics that 5	  
determine the value of the intangibles as measured by the upfront fees and periodic fees 6	  
which are set out at the end of the hypothesis to be verified. Then the third section 7	  
explains the survey conducted to obtain data, describes the sample and defines the 8	  
variables to be studied. The fourth section describes the methodology used to analyze the 9	  
data collected, while the fifth section presents the results of the analysis, which are 10	  
compared with the hypotheses put forward. Finally the sixth section offers the 11	  
conclusions drawn and future lines of research. 12	  
2  Background 13	  
We have used the franchise business in the restaurant industry in Mexico for this 14	  
empirical analysis for two reasons. First, because of the importance and the growth 15	  
registered in the franchise system in this country, which also occur in more developed 16	  
countries despite the fact that studies into franchising in this country are scarce. 17	  
According to the International Franchise Association (IFA)1, in 2006 there were more 18	  
than 2,500 franchise systems operating in the USA. In Europe, France occupies first 19	  
place, followed by Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom with 855, 830, 800, 20	  
735 and 718 franchise systems, respectively, in 2005 (Holmberg and Morgan, 2007).  21	  




However, this importance and growth taking place in the franchise system 1	  
worldwide also took place a few years ago in the emerging markets of Latin America, 2	  
where the highest numbers were recorded in Mexico and Brazil (Dant and Kaufmann, 3	  
2003). Although Brazil boasts almost 45% of all head offices and more than 50% of 4	  
outlets, Mexico, with much less surface area and a much lower population, has more than 5	  
25% and 42% of the head offices and outlets in Latin America, respectively.  6	  
The franchise system was introduced into Mexico at the end of the eighties and, 7	  
according to the Mexican Franchise Association (AMF), there were more than 500 8	  
business and around 32,000 branches or points of sale in 2008, with an annual turnover of 9	  
approximately 85,000 million pesos, generating more than half a million direct jobs. Its 10	  
contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Mexico is estimated to be 5%. 11	  
 From 1998 to 2007, the number of points of sale in Mexico increased from 1,600 12	  
to 6,000, which is an annual increase of 440 new points of sale. This rapid growth has 13	  
placed Mexico in eighth place in the international ranking of franchising countries in 14	  
2009.  15	  
Second, because the restaurant industry is highly significant in the franchise 16	  
systems of most countries. According to the classification of both the AMF and the 17	  
Mexican Secretariat of Economy, this industry includes restaurants, cafeterias and fast-18	  
food businesses, which include both food and drink. The AMF also reports that in terms 19	  
of franchise sectors, 24% corresponds to the services sector, 23% to restaurants, 21% to 20	  
retailing and 14% to education. Yet if we consider the restaurant industry, the percentage 21	  
of its franchise businesses comes to 60% of the total.  22	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In other countries like Spain, the restaurant sector is the most important in terms 1	  
of turnover, which amounted to 5,269 million euros in 2007. Nonetheless, the fashion 2	  
sector exceeds it in terms of the number of chains with 133 as opposed to the 116 in the 3	  
restaurant sector of a total of 905 of all chains (Bordonaba et al., 2008). Likewise, the 4	  
restaurant sector has a higher percentage of franchised units in relation to all the owned 5	  
and franchised units with a total of 86% in 2006. Besides, it was the only sector with a 6	  
rising trend over the period 1994-2006 (Díez et al., 2008). Therefore, this sector has been 7	  
the object of various studies, and of some carried out in specific subsectors such as bars 8	  
serving more than one type of beer (Ramírez, 2007). 9	  
The same trend is observed in the US, which is precisely why the restaurant sector 10	  
was selected by: Bradach (1997) in the study on organizational performance in five US 11	  
chains; by Sen (1998) to analyze the relationship between the higher number of 12	  
franchisees and firm growth; by Michael (1999) to compare advertising in franchised 13	  
units and owned units; by Dant and Kaufmann (2003) to study the changes taking place 14	  
in the tendency to franchise as the time chains have been operating lengthens; and by 15	  
Michael and Combs (2008) to investigate the reasons behind failures. It is not only the 16	  
restaurant industry that is important within the franchise system; although Hua and 17	  
Templeton (2010) recommend adopting franchises in the US restaurant industry to 18	  
improve sales in forthcoming years. 19	  
Nonetheless, several empirical studies on the franchise systems in various sectors 20	  
of activity (restaurant, retailing and service) and countries (USA, Canada, Japan, Austria 21	  
and Spain) follow the regression method to explain the reasons that lead to franchisees 22	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paying an upfront fee and periodic fees to the franchisor. To go about this, several 1	  
franchise characteristics are employed, which are summarized in Table 1. 2	  
Table 1 3	  
Relevant literature on the estimation of franchisees’ payments 4	  
No.  Author Sample Variable 
to be 
explained 
Explanatory variables  R2 
1  Sen (1993) 996 franchises Franchise 
fee and 
royalty rate 
25 variables related with 
channel control, franchisor 







152 franchises Franchise 
fee 
Sale, royalties 0.280 








Length of service, length of 
contract, outlets, turnover, 




et al. (2006) 
212 franchise 






experience in the market, 
time package, AEF, 






franchising, expansion, own 











Knowledge on the local 
franchising market and 










Variation in sales, 
percentage of closures, 
outlet size, investment in 
marketing, investment in 
training,  length of service, 












Investment, growth in 
outlets, years in business, 
variation of sales, 
franchisee’s value added, 
sales per outlet  
 
 1	  
Sen (1993) observed in 996 franchises in the USA and Canada how channel 2	  
control and franchisor services, such as financial help and centralized data processing, 3	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influence both the upfront fee and royalties, although the same cannot be said of the 1	  
franchisee risks. 2	  
López et al (2001) consider the initial upfront fee to be a means of covering the 3	  
costs which the franchisor has to defray when a new franchising outlet is being opened. 4	  
This initial fee covers technical assistance, promotional objects and the outlet’s design, 5	  
among others. Clients easily recognize a franchises’ products by their brand name and 6	  
because the chains’ outlets are similar; this situation allows reductions in search costs by 7	  
extrapolating former experience with other premises in the network (Rubin, 1978). In 8	  
order to explain the franchisee payment, López et al (2001) use a sample of 500 insignias 9	  
from all the sectors in Spain, plus the following variables: the time since the franchise 10	  
was set up, length of contract, outlets, turnover, investment, population and outlet size. 11	  
Of these, only turnover and investment are significant at 5% and 10%, respectively.   12	  
Bordonaba et al. (2006) analyze the value of the upfront fee paid in a sample of 13	  
212 firms in both the hotel and catering and fashion sectors. As the most positively 14	  
valued intangibles, these authors identified those related to capacities (expansion or size), 15	  
reputation (participation in the Spanish Franchise Association (AEF), initial investment 16	  
and the time taken to set up the business), and organizational resources (contract terms). 17	  
Kaufmann and Dant (2001) and Windsperger (2002) found a positive relationship 18	  
between the initial upfront fee and royalties. For the former authors, the upfront fee did 19	  
not initially compensate the franchisees’ income surpluses. For Windsperger, more know-20	  
how during the pre-contract period required more intangible-type investments on the 21	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franchisee’s part while the contract lasted in order to maintain a certain value for the 1	  
brand name.  2	  
Nevertheless, the franchisee also contributes knowledge of the local market to the 3	  
system as an intangible asset (Windsperger, 2002). As a result, the greater the 4	  
franchisee’s knowledge about the local market, the lower the royalties; and the higher the 5	  
number of training days, the higher the royalties. 6	  
Vázquez (2005) studies these variable payments with a sample of 145 franchising 7	  
networks in Spain in 2000. The results of this study are consistent with the theory that 8	  
maintains that such payments generate bonuses to alleviate the bilateral moral risk 9	  
problems that affect franchisors and franchisees alike. Therefore, the variables that 10	  
measure the importance of the franchisor’s work (percentage of closures, outlet size, 11	  
investment in marketing, investment in training, network size and initial upfront fee) 12	  
were found to be significant for periodic payments.  13	  
More recently, Maruyama and Yamashita (2010) analyzed 182 franchising chains 14	  
in Japan to explain the upfront fee and royalties in 2003. Their findings coincide with 15	  
some results obtained by Vázquez (2005) in terms of the positive effect of the number of 16	  
outlets, yet they contradict the results of Sen (1993) and Vázquez (2005) in relation to the 17	  
negative effect of the variation of sales on the dependent variables.  18	  
Other research (García-Herrera and Llorca-Vivero, 2010; Grace and Weaven, 19	  
2010) have attempted to explain variables other than the upfront fee and royalties, such as 20	  




As we may note, these cited works did not include any financial variable, the 1	  
correlation coefficients obtained were quite low in most cases, and a large number of 2	  
explanatory variables was used which no doubt could be reduced to a few factors, as 3	  
shown in the studies carried out to define strategic groups. In addition, these explanatory 4	  
variables may present multicollinearity and, therefore, erroneous interpretations of the 5	  
models.  6	  
Therefore we put forward the following hypotheses:  7	  
H1: The characteristics or the operative and financial variables of franchising businesses 8	  
intercorrelate, and may be condensed to a few representative factors of the intangibles 9	  
transmitted. 10	  
H2: The factors obtained and a small number of explanatory variables account for the 11	  
value of the intangibles transferred by means of the franchise fee and the royalty rate. 12	  
H3: Franchises’ efficiency is one of the intangibles transmitted in the relationship.  13	  
 14	  
3 Information sources 15	  
According to the AMF, there were around 300 franchises in 2005 in Mexico in the 16	  
restaurant sector. Yet there is no database available that provides information about them. 17	  
After making initial contact with them all, certain abnormalities were detected. Therefore, 18	  
a final total population of 270 firms participated in this study. 19	  
A survey was used to collect data. For this purpose, the survey was conducted to 20	  
collect a series of distinctive operative franchising variables, in line with the studies 21	  
13 
 
reviewed in the previous section and other financial variables. These were grouped into 1	  
three types: identifying the franchise; general franchise data ranging from the initial 2	  
investment and the initial upfront payment required for their location and association 3	  
membership; and the franchise firm’s financial and economic data.  4	  
This survey was previously tested among academic experts and professionals 5	  
from the franchise sector. Surveys were conducted in the first five months of 2006 by 6	  
means of personal interviews with the franchisor firms’ agents. Valid responses were 7	  
obtained for 160 of the national and foreign franchises (a response rate of 60%), and 8	  
these firms became the object of our study. 9	  
From the data collected with the survey, we were able to verify how the total 10	  
amount of the initial upfront fee varied between 3,000 and 190,000 US dollars, with a 11	  
median2 and modal value of 30,500 and 20,000 US dollars, respectively.  12	  
Half the chains do not charge subsequent advertising fees and 4% do not pay 13	  
royalties either. These total periodic payments are established as a percentage of the 14	  
franchisee’s annual sales (around 6%, of which 1% corresponds to advertizing) and may 15	  
amount to as much as 146,850 US dollars a year, whose median3 value is 15,748 US 16	  
dollars.  17	  
These periodic payments reflect the conditions of the agreement reached and the 18	  
organizational resources that are transferred through exploitation manuals which, along 19	  
with the initial upfront fee, take the value of the intangibles transferred with the franchise. 20	  
                                                      
2	  (percentiles	  25%,	  50%	  and	  75%	  are:	  20,000,	  30,500,	  and	  60,000	  US	  dollars,	  respectively).	  




    Thirty-five variables have been defined from the rest of the data collected with 1	  
the survey (Table 2), and will be used to explain the value of the franchises’ intangibles. 2	  
Table 2 3	  
List of the variables used to explain the value of the intangibles 4	  
No. Type of 
variable 
Variable Definition 
 Qualitative variables: 
1 
Trade register Registered 
Indicates whether the franchise is registered. 
 
2 Origin  Origin Indicates whether the franchise is Mexican or not.  
3 Membership  AMF Indicates whether the franchise belongs to the Mexican Franchise Association. 
4 Expansion Central-M Indicates whether it is present in the central region of Mexico. 
5  North-west Indicates whether it is present in the north-west region of Mexico. 
6  North-east Indicates whether it is present in the north-east region of Mexico. 
7  South-west Indicates whether it is present in the south-west region of Mexico. 
8  South-east Indicates whether it is present in the south-east region of Mexico. 
9  Central-A Indicates whether it is present in Central America. 
10  South Indicates whether it is present in South America. 
11  USA Indicates whether it is present in the USA. 
12  Europe Indicates whether it is present in Europe. 
13  Canada Indicates whether it is present in Canada. 
14 Optimum Outlet Indicates whether the optimum location to set up 
15 
 
location the firm is a business outlet. 
15  Shopping Indicates whether the optimum location to set up the firm is a shopping mall. 
16  Isolated Indicates whether the optimum location to set up the firm is an isolated unit.  
 Quantitative variables: 




Number of years that the first outlet or point of 
sale has been operating.  
18  Franchise years 
Number of years since the firm became a 
franchise.  
19 Size Size 04 Total number of branches or outlets in the chain in 2004. 
20  Size 05 Total number of branches or outlets in the chain in 2005. 
21 Economical Initial investment 
Cost of the initial investment required to set up 
the franchise in thousands of US dollars. 
22  Recovery rate 
Average number of months needed to recover 
the initial investment. 
23  Sales Mean sales obtained by the outlet or point of sale in 2005 in thousands of US dollars. 
24 
 Sales cost 
Average cost of the firm’s sales in 2005 in 
thousands of US dollars. That is, what it cost the 
firm to acquire the merchandise sold. 
25  Gross profit The firm’s mean gross profit in 2005 in thousands of US dollars. 
26  Operating cost 
The firm’s mean operating costs in the year 
2005 in thousands of US dollars. 
27  Financial cost 
The firm’s mean overall financial costs in the 
year 2005 in thousands of US dollars. 
28  Profit The mean profit before the firm paid tax 2005 in thousands of US dollars.  
29  Taxes The taxes paid by the firm in 2005 in thousands of US dollars. 
16 
 
30  Net profit The firm’s net profit in 2005 in thousands of US dollars. 
31  Assets The firm’s total assets in 2005 in thousands of US dollars.  
32  Liabilities The firm’s total liabilities in 2005 in thousands of US dollars. 
33  Capitals Sum of the firm’s contributed and earned capitals in 2005 in thousands of US dollars. 
34 
 Profitability ratio 
The economic profitability ratio as a result of 
either investment or economic performance. 
This is the quotient between the net profit and 
the entire assets.  
35  Turnover ratio 
The turnover ratio of the total assets. This is the 
quotient between sales and the entire assets.  
 1	  
Column 1 in Table 2 indicates the number of the franchise chain order, column 2 2	  
shows the type of variable, column 3 is its name, and column 4 provides the meanings. 3	  
Of the 35 variables, 16 are dummy variables with different characteristics: if the 4	  
franchise is registered, its origin, if it is an AMF member, its expansion in Mexico and in 5	  
other countries, and its optimum location in business outlets, shopping malls or as an 6	  
isolated unit. The variable takes a value of 1 if the chain presents a characteristic and 0 7	  
otherwise. 8	  
Of the total number of 160 franchise networks analyzed, only 3 were registered or 9	  
recorded, 90 were of Mexican origin and 45 belonged to the AMF. With respect to 10	  
geographic expansion, 156 outlets were located in the central region of Mexico, 149 in 11	  
the northwest, 150 in the northeast, 149 in the southwest, 149 in the southeast, 39 in 12	  
Central America, 41 in South America, 32 in the US, 23 in Europe and 33 in Canada. 13	  
17 
 
The 19 remaining variables are of a quantitative kind and refer to the time that the 1	  
franchise firm and the franchise have operated, that is, maturity, the number of franchise 2	  
premises that are owned and franchised, the amount that the franchisee invested, the time 3	  
taken to recover this investment, the franchisee’s economic performance and balance, and 4	  
some economic ratios. Below, Table 3 statistically summarizes them. 5	  
 6	  
Table 3 7	  
Statistical summary of the quantitative explanatory variables 8	  
Variable Mean  Median Standard deviation 
Min. Max. 
Operating years 20.4 15.4 17.4 2 76 
Franchise years 9.9 7.0 8.4 1 34 
Size 04 25 12.0 38.5 1 304 
Size 05 29.6 15.0 43.3 1 342 
Initial investment 94.2 75.0 79.5 3.2 375 
Recovery rate 10.9 8.5 6.8 0 36 
Sales 436.4 303.3 373.6 21.6 2285.6 
Sales cost 301.2 213.2 262.6 15 1600 
Gross profit 137.0 90.9 124.2 6.48 685.7 
Operating cost 32.9 23.7 27.9 1.51 173.7 
Financial cost 2.4 0.0 5.15 0 46 
Profit 101.8 65.8 96.6 4.6 587.7 
Taxes 37.3 16.9 54.4 0 493.9 
Net profit 64.5 47.7 54.1 3.1 331.3 
Assets 297.9 227.0 255.7 18 1600 
Liabilities 190.5 138.8 170.1 9 1120 
18 
 
Capitals 107.4 77.5 96.6 6 480 
Profitability ratio 0.2339 0.2221 0.0825 0.0062 0.8886 
Turnover ratio 1.567 1.515 0.532 0.048 5.515 
 1	  
The franchises in this study have been operating for a mean of 20 and 10 years as a 2	  
firm and a franchise, respectively. The total number of owned and franchised outlets is, 3	  
on average, 25 in 2004 and 30 in 2005, which is a mean growth of 5 units in only one 4	  
year. The franchisee has to make an initial investment of some 94,200 US dollars. 5	  
Otherwise, an initial upfront fee is paid which the franchisee recovers in a time of under 6	  
11 months, although this time could be as long as three years. The mean sales that each 7	  
franchisee makes are 436,400 US dollars a year, of which 64,500 US dollar are net 8	  
profits; these amounts correspond to 156.7% and 23.39% of the value of the assets, 9	  
respectively. The mean value of the franchisee’s assets is 297,900 US dollars, whose 10	  
mean liabilities amount to 190,500 US dollars and whose book value is 107,400 US 11	  
dollars. 12	  
 13	  
4 Methodology 14	  
Having reviewed the literature, we found that each variable had been assigned an 15	  
intangible of the franchise (experience, image, brand name, organizational resources, 16	  
capacities, etc.) with a meaning, its own explanatory power and which is independent of 17	  
the rest. They have all been jointly used to account for the franchisee’s payments. 18	  
Nonetheless, there is every likelihood that several variables have the same intangible 19	  
meaning. Therefore it would be interesting to reduce the number of the dimensions and to 20	  
19 
 
identify those factors that explain the value of the underlying intangible resources within 1	  
the series of franchise chain characteristics. The methodology used to confirm Hypothesis 2	  
H1 was a factorial analysis with varimax rotation. Those factors whose eigenvalues were 3	  
higher than the unit were selected from the rotated components matrix. 4	  
Having determined the intangible factors, we did an ordinary least-square regression 5	  
analysis to confirm Hypotheses H2 and H3 and to determine the components of the 6	  
intangibles value. In general terms, the regression equation to be estimated in each case is 7	  
as follows: 8	  
          (1) 9	  
Where the dependent variable V is the upfront fee paid or the franchise chain 10	  
royalties, and the independent variables (X1,…..Xn) were, first, the factors previously 11	  
obtained in the factorial analysis and, second, the value of the franchise’s characteristics 12	  
where the characteristics are substitutes of each factor. ε is the error term. 13	  
The coefficients in Equation (1) reflect the marginal valuation that the franchisees 14	  
confer to each particular characteristic of the franchise business. 15	  
For the purpose of obtaining the normality assumptions of the multivariate analysis, 16	  
neperian logarithm (Ln) transformations of the quantitative variables were done, except 17	  
the ratio variables, Profitability and Turnover. In this way, better results were obtained in 18	  
all the regression models than with the original variables form, as some other authors 19	  
have done (Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994; Sen, 1998; Haufmann and Dant, 2001; 20	  




5 Results 1	  
Table 4 presents the results of the principal component analysis with varimax rotation 2	  
which was applied to the quantitative variables. After 4 repetitions, the varimax-rotated 3	  
components matrix revealed the existence of 3 factors whose eigenvalues were higher 4	  
than the unit. The results of the KMO index and Bartlett’s test of sphericity reflect that 5	  
the use of this factorial analysis to reduce the number of the variables employed and to 6	  
identify the intangibles is advisable. 7	  
Table 4 8	  
Results of the factor analysis of the variables 9	  
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3  
Ln Operating years  0.857    
Ln Franchise years 0.822    
Ln Initial investment  0.928    
Ln Recovery rate  0.835    
Ln Sales  0.979    
Ln Sales Cost   0.969    
Ln Gross profit  0.982    
Ln Operating costs  0.974    
Ln Financial costs  0.931    
Ln Profit  0.976    
Ln Taxes  0.748    
Ln Net profit  0.976    
Ln Assets  0.963    
Ln Liabilities  0.951    
Ln Capitals 0.917    
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Ln Size 04     0.957 
Ln Size 05    0.974 
Profitability ratio   0.986  















Determinant of correlation 
matrix                3.08E-034 
KMO index                0.841 
Bartlett’s test        3716.739** 
    
(**) Indicates a level of significance of 99% 1	  
We obtained only 3 factors. The first explains almost 72% of the variance and 2	  
groups all the variables related to the years of the chain as a firm and also as a franchise, 3	  
the amount of the franchisee’s initial investment, the recovery rate of the investment and 4	  
the franchisee’s results. All these are positive, meaning that they vary in the same 5	  
direction. This factor represents the image of the brand name (initial investment), 6	  
experience and reputation (years) and the capacity to make a profit, as well as the 7	  
franchisee’s success (results). In short, this factor could be known as the franchise’s 8	  
brand name since the brand mark image is consolidated with experience and is a 9	  
guaranteed source of future results for the franchisee.  10	  
The second factor brings together the number of units that the insignia possesses 11	  
nationally and internationally in the years 2004 and 2005, and includes both owned and 12	  
franchised units. This factor represents the size of the franchise. A larger size allows the 13	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chain to accomplish economies of scale in its promotion and, therefore, a much more 1	  
competitive costs structure which, at the same time, also helps the chain’s brand name to 2	  
expand (Sen, 1998). A larger sized network also implies the franchisee’s hard work and 3	  
greater managerial capacity (Vázquez, 2005). 4	  
The third and final factor explains the efficiency in the franchisee’s management, 5	  
which is revealed by the results and sales ratios over the franchise firms’ assets.   6	  
Consequently, Hypothesis H1 is feasible as the variables characterizing the 7	  
franchises may be reduced to a lower number of factors which have the same 8	  
interpretation potential.                       9	  
Next we did a regression analysis by taking the neperian logarithm of the 10	  
franchise fee as a dependent variable (Table 5). First, the regression analysis was 11	  
performed with the three factors (Model 1), of which the third was not significant. Thus it 12	  
was eliminated and the regression analysis was done with the first two factors (Model 2). 13	  
Next a variable from within each factor was selected as a substitute of the factor itself to 14	  
obtain Model 3 to which a third qualitative-type variable, that had not been included in 15	  
the factorial analysis, was added to obtain the best result in Model 4.   16	  
Table 5 17	  
Estimating the value of the franchise fee  18	  






































      
N 59 59  159 159 
Adj. R2  0.880 0.881  0.877 0.893 
F 137.538** 207.559**  569.054** 441.941** 
Table 5 shows how only the brand name and size factors explain 88% of the 1	  
variability of the value of the intangibles transferred in the franchise. Therefore, 2	  
Hypothesis H2 may be accepted, but not Hypothesis H3.  3	  
The level of explanation was maintained when the brand name and size factors 4	  
were substituted for the sales and number of outlets in 2004 variables as substitutes of the 5	  
factors. When the qualitative variable belonging to AMF was introduced as an intangible 6	  
in relation to the franchise’s external membership, a level of explanation of 89.3% was 7	  
finally obtained. Being an AMF member indicates that the Association backs the good 8	  
performance on the franchisors’ part in terms of ethics and morals; this is a guarantee for 9	  
franchisees. The remaining qualitative variables were not seen to be significant in all four 10	  
models, indicating that registration, the franchise’s origin, and its expansion and location 11	  
do not account for the intangibles exchanged for the upfront fee paid. 12	  
The previously described process was carried out with the periodic payments or 13	  






Table 6 1	  
Estimation of the value of royalties  2	  















































N 152 152  159 77 152 
Adj. R2  0.819 0.819  0.908 0.735 0.863 
F 85.669** 128.07**  1444.74** 215.04** 954.89** 
 3	  
Regarding the variable payments, factor 3 was not significant in explaining the 4	  
neperian logarithm of the periodic payments, while the first two factors, brand name and 5	  
size, explained 81.9% of the value of the intangibles transferred with continuous 6	  
counseling, which is a much higher figure to those shown in Table 1. Therefore, 7	  
Hypothesis H2 may be accepted, but not Hypothesis H3. 8	  
However, when the representative variables of the factors were substituted, only 9	  
sale volume was significant, and explained up to 86.3% of the total royalties. This may be 10	  
accounted for by the fact that the franchisee is willing to make periodic payments in 11	  
exchange for receiving continuous counseling if this leads to better results, irrespective of 12	  





4 Conclusions 1	  
Despite there not being a franchising database available in Mexico, which exists 2	  
in other countries such as the USA, Japan, Spain, etc., having conducted personal 3	  
interviews with 60% of Mexican franchises has enabled us to conduct this research into 4	  
restaurant industry franchising in Mexico, which also complements the research work 5	  
done into this system in the US (Sen, 1993).  6	  
The result of the factorial analysis suggests that the firms’ operational, economic, 7	  
accounting and financial characteristics may be grouped into only three factors: brand, 8	  
size and efficiency; this does not coincide with the results obtained by Carney and 9	  
Gedajlovic (1991) and Rondán et al. (2007), among others, who obtained 5 and 4 factors 10	  
or groups of variables. This reduces the number of variables used to explain the payments 11	  
made by the franchisee and facilitates the interpretation of the intangibles transmitted in 12	  
franchises. However, it will be necessary to complete and extend this study by including 13	  
other sectors to confirm the representativeness of these three factors alone in all the 14	  
franchise sectors. 15	  
Three variables have explained 89% of the variability of the upfront fee value 16	  
under study, which has a much greater explanatory power than that obtained in other 17	  
research (Sen, 1993; Kaufmann and Dant, 2001; López et al., 2001; Bordonaba et al., 18	  
2006) where, on occasion, the variables included in the brand name factor (operating 19	  
years, investment, sales, experience in the market) are all considered simultaneously in 20	  
the regression model; this implies a possible resulting collinearity problem that may lead 21	  
to an erroneous interpretation of the regression coefficients. In other words, there are 22	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three intangible assets transferred with the upfront fee: capacity to make profit (the brand 1	  
name factor), economies of scale (size) obtained with a large number of outlets, and 2	  
acknowledged reputation for belonging to the AMF. The assets that are not taken into 3	  
account when the upfront fee is paid are the firm’s geographic expansion or the franchise 4	  
units’ efficiency. These results coincide with those obtained in the work of Bordonaba et 5	  
al. (2006) in which initial investment, chain size and Spanish Franchise Association 6	  
membership are relevant aspects in relation to the upfront fee paid, but are contradictory 7	  
as far as geographical expansion is concerned, which has no influence on the upfront fee 8	  
in Mexico. The results obtained are also in agreement with the work of Kaufmann and 9	  
Dant (2001) in which franchisees’ sales play a fundamental role. Similarly, they coincide 10	  
with the work of Maruyama and Yamashita (2010) in that they consider investment, 11	  
operating years and sales.  12	  
The intangible resources transferred by means of periodic payments mainly relate 13	  
to secure demand and, therefore, to less sales risks. Although this finding coincides with 14	  
Maruyama and Yamashita (2010), these authors also include five additional variables in 15	  
their model. Only sales show an 81% explanatory power of the periodic payments. 16	  
Finally, firm efficiency is not taken into account in these payments. 17	  
The main contribution of this study to the literature is that it includes variables 18	  
that relate not only to the firms’ results, but their accounting and efficiency; it uses a 19	  
factor analysis to identify and summarize the key factors considered in transferring 20	  
franchisors’ intangibles; it analyzes the intangibles transferred with the payments made, 21	  
in other words, the franchise fee and periodic payments. The study implications for 22	  
franchisors and franchisees alike are very important to help develop and improve the 23	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franchise system in Mexico. They provide future franchisees with information about the 1	  
franchise chains in the Mexican restaurant industry, and identify their characteristics and 2	  
the strategies carried out for decisions to be made in the future on key factors to 3	  
determine initial fees and periodic payments. These study implications enable franchisors 4	  
to know the main lines of action to be taken not only to improve their relationships with 5	  
franchisees, but to accomplish greater future success in chain management and increased 6	  
competitiveness terms.  7	  
This research may prove an important starting point for future research lines into 8	  
Mexican franchising; for instance, the inclusion of new explanatory variables in the 9	  
model; knowledge of the franchisee’s local market; the franchisee’s number of training 10	  
days a year; the growing number of franchisees and their causes; territorial exclusivity; 11	  
and length of contract; just as other authors have done (López et al., 2001; Bordonaba et 12	  
al., 2006; Windsperger, 2002). It could also prove interesting to extend the study on 13	  
franchising to other sectors, such as other area of the services sector, retailing and 14	  
education, to do an in-depth study into the efficiency between owned and franchised 15	  
units, and to conduct longitudinal studies on introducing variability of the variables over 16	  
time (Vázquez, 2005; Maruyama and Yamashita, 2010). 17	  
 18	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